We test various explanations of the ex-day price anomaly using Nasdaq-listed firms. Similar to NYSE-listed firms, on average the prices of Nasdaq-listed firms drop by less than the dividend amount. However, the average Nasdaq price-drop is substantially smaller than the NYSE and translates to an imputed dividend tax rate that is double the maximum tax rate. We thus find little support for the tax hypothesis. We also find little support for the short-term trading hypothesis and various other explanations. The significant disconnect we document between Nasdaq dividends and price changes seems to support the "free dividend fallacy."
Introduction
We test various explanations of the ex-day stock price behavior using Nasdaq-listed firms. For over half a century academics have noted that, on average, stock prices fall by less than the dividend amount on the ex-day. 1 Much research has been undertaken to explain this stylized fact as it has important implications for both corporate finance and asset pricing. The predominant and most enduring explanation of this ex-day behavior is taxes. In their seminal paper on the issue, Elton and Gruber (1970) point out a dollar of capital gains is worth more than a dollar of dividends whenever capital gains are taxed more favorably than dividends. As this has often been the case in the U.S., the equilibrium price drop will be less than the dividend. Measuring the price-drop ratio (hereafter PDR) as the ratio of the change in price to the dividend amount, Elton and Gruber (1970) document that the PDR is on average around 80%, i.e. prices fall on average by 80% of the dividend amount on the ex-day. As the imputed marginal tax rate from the PDR is consistent with the highest marginal tax rate at the time, Elton and Gruber interpret the results as consistent with their tax hypothesis. Many papers have since found support for this tax explanation (a partial list includes Barclay, 1987; Naranjo, Nimalendran and Ryngaert, 2000; Graham, Michaely and Roberts, 2003; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2005; Graham and Kumar, 2006; Whitworth and Rao, 2010) .
The literature investigating the U.S. evidence almost exclusively focuses on NYSE-listed firms. 2 This is understandable for papers written before Nasdaq came into being or before Nasdaq data were readily accessible but it is a little surprising for papers written since then. Perhaps it reflects a view that the technology-laden exchange does not have many dividend-paying firms. As surprising as it may appear to some, Nasdaq has a non-negligible number of dividend payers. After imposing various restrictions, we have a sample of 107,200 dividend observations for the period, compared to a sample of 160,477 NYSE observations with corresponding data filters.
Moreover, an underlying assumption of tax-based explanations is that retail investor characteristics such as marginal tax rates are impounded into ex-day stock prices. To the extent that retail investors have a greater ownership concentration in Nasdaq firms relative to NYSE firms, the taxbased explanations may be more relevant in the Nasdaq setting.
We find that the average Nasdaq PDR is only 39% (the median is 27%), compared to the average NYSE PDR of 86% (the median is 93%), and is substantially below a lower theoretical bound implied by the tax hypothesis. Moreover, the PDR translates to an imputed marginal dividend tax rate of 71%, almost double the average top marginal dividend tax rate over the sample period. Both the dividend tax rate and the capital gains tax rate change a number of times during our sample period. To deal with this, we partition our sample into various tax regimes. We find that within each partition, the Nasdaq PDR is significantly below the lower theoretical bound implied by the tax hypothesis. The average PDRs translate to imputed dividend tax rates up to two and half times the actual maximum rate. Again, the evidence is inconsistent with the tax
hypothesis.
An implication of the tax hypothesis is the formation of tax clienteles, i.e., investors facing relatively low marginal tax rates will favor high dividend-yielding stocks and investors facing relatively high marginal tax rates will favor low dividend-yielding stocks. If tax clienteles exist then PDRs will increase in dividend yield, as Elton and Gruber (1970) , Barclay (1987) , Koski (1996) , Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003) and Whitworth and Rao (2010) , amongst others, find for NYSE firms. However, we find that the Nasdaq PDR significantly decreases in dividend yield, opposite the prediction from tax clientele models.
3
A reason for our findings may be transaction costs as Nasdaq firms potentially have larger transaction costs relative to NYSE firms. 4 We note, however, that significant transaction costs make arbitrage more difficult and it is in such cases that PDRs are most likely to reflect the marginal tax rate of retail investors (see, for example, Elton, Gruber and Rentzler, 1984; Karpoff and Walkling, 1990; Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994) . Nonetheless, we partition our sample into quartiles based on various proxies for transaction costs including liquidity, bid-ask spread, stock price, volatility, and firm size. For each transaction cost proxy and for each quartile, the average PDRs remain significantly below the lower theoretical bound implied by the tax hypothesis.
3 Karpoff and Walkling (1990) also find evidence inconsistent with tax clienteles. In particular, they find mean exday returns increase monotonically with dividend yield. 4 While studies such as Huang and Stoll (1996) document wider spreads on the Nasdaq exchange relative to the NYSE, it is not clear the NYSE necessarily dominates the Nasdaq exchange in terms of lower transaction costs. For example, Chan and Lakonishok (1997) find execution costs for institutional investors trading relatively smaller firms are lower on the Nasdaq exchange while Affleck-Graves, Hegde and Miller (1994) find the inventory holding component of the bid-ask spread is larger on the NYSE.
As an alternative test of the tax hypothesis, we follow Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and explore the ex-day price behavior around non-taxable distributions (i.e. stock dividends and stock splits). If taxes are the driving force behind the ex-day results, then we should not observe similar ex-day price behavior for non-taxable distributions. However, we find significant abnormal exday returns for the non-taxable Nasdaq distributions, providing further evidence against the tax hypothesis.
Not all investors, however, have a tax preference for dividends over capital gains. For example, short-term traders and tax-exempt institutions do not face a tax differential between dividends and capital gains. Moreover, corporations have a preference for dividends due to the 70% exclusion on corporation dividend income. Thus, in the absence of transaction costs, an expected PDR of less than one presents profit opportunities to some market participants.
5
Consequently, another major strand of the literature argues one cannot infer the marginal tax rate of retail investors from the PDR. Rather, the PDR reflects the transaction costs faced by tax-neutral or tax-advantaged entities (see, for example, Kalay, 1982; Walkling, 1988, 1990; Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994; Koski, 1996; Michaely and Villa, 1996) . This view is called the "short-term trading hypothesis."
6
We employ the framework of Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) to test the short-term trading hypothesis. Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) develop a model that incorporates trading among individual investors, tax-neutral arbitrageurs and tax-advantaged corporate traders in the presence of both transaction costs and risk. In regressions of the ex-day percentage price drop on dividend yield, Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) find a slope coefficient of one. Within their framework, this suggests that short-term traders are the marginal price-setters around ex-days and provides evidence consistent with the short-term trading hypothesis. We find that for Nasdaq firms the slope coefficients are significantly less than one. This is consistently the case in the overall sample as 5 Heath and Jarrow (1988) discuss limits to arbitrage in absence of transaction costs. As Kalay and Lemmon (2008) point out, even though the "arbitrage" is not risk-free, any risk exposure is relatively short in duration. Moreover, the risk is likely diversifiable as there are several thousand ex-dividend events in a calendar year and the risk associated with these events should be temporally independent. Investors can also hedge part of the risk by using options, when available. 6 As Walkling (1988, 1990 ) point out, the tax hypothesis and the short-term trading hypothesis are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Investors trading for reasons unrelated to the dividend have incentives to time their trades to maximize after-tax returns, as implied by the tax hypothesis. This attracts short-term traders who engage in arbitrage up to their marginal transaction costs. In other words, for stocks in which "arbitrage" is too costly, PDRs may reflect the marginal tax rate of retail investors with longer holding periods.
well as when we partition the sample into sub-samples based on varying tax regimes or various proxies for transaction costs. Thus, we do not find support for the short-term trading hypothesis.
Another strand of the literature focuses on market microstructure-based explanations. Bali and Hite (1998) argue price discreteness imposed by minimum tick-sizes can induce PDRs of less than one. However, using NYSE firms Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003) and Jakob and Ma (2004) do not find support for this argument. For example, Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003) find PDRs significantly decrease around tick-size reductions for NYSE firms, opposite the ticksize prediction. Following a similar procedure, we investigate whether Nasdaq PDRs change around mandated tick-size reductions. We do not find any significant change in Nasdaq PDRs. We also investigate other potential microstructure arguments. Prior to the mid-1990s, Nasdaq dealers avoided odd-eighths price quotes (Christie and Schultz, 1994) . In addition, prior to 1993 Nasdaq dealers did not automatically adjust prices for outstanding limit orders on ex-dividend days (Dubofsky, 1992; Jakob and Ma, 2004) . Both of these factors could potentially produce PDRs significantly less than one. When we exclude these periods, our results and inferences are unaffected. 7 Thus, these market microstructure-based arguments do not explain our results.
We view the Nasdaq setting as an "out of sample" test of the various explanations for the ex-day anomaly and provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the ex-day price behavior for Nasdaq firms. We make several contributions to the literature. Firstly, we document that Nasdaq
PDRs are substantially smaller than that previously reported for NYSE firms, although this difference has shrunk in recent years (Mortal, Paudel and Silveri, 2017) , the level of Nasdaq PDRs is still too low to be explained by traditional theories. Secondly, we document significant positive ex-day returns for non-taxable Nasdaq distributions. This corroborates the Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) evidence for NYSE firms and survives the Conrad and Conroy (1994) order imbalance evidence. 8 Thirdly, we do not find support for the short-term trading hypothesis. Even for firms with relatively small transaction costs, we continue to find that the Nasdaq evidence is generally inconsistent with the short-term trading hypothesis. We also rule out market microstructure explanations. We find that Nasdaq PDRs are simply too low, on average, to be explained by taxes 7 We also note that the bias induced by the limit order adjustment is more of a concern for close-to-open returns and for thinly traded stocks. As we use close-to-close returns and as our results are unaffected when we require trades on both the cum-day and the ex-day, the limit order adjustment does not drive our findings. 8 Conrad and Conroy (1994) find that the Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) result is largely attributable to order imbalances driven by a tendency for transactions to occur at the ask price after the dividend. They note that this tendency, though, is significantly less severe for Nasdaq-listed firms.
or short-term traders. A recent study by Hartzmark and Solomon (2018) finds evidence that investors trade as if they track dividends and price changes as separate and independent accounts, without fully appreciating the fact that dividends come at the expense of price drops -a phenomenon they term the "free dividends fallacy." To the extent that the Nasdaq stocks are more volatile and that the Nasdaq traditionally lists technology firms, the disconnect between dividends and price changes may be more pronounced with Nasdaq firms, consistent with what we document in this paper.
A closely related paper to ours is Mortal, Paudel and Silveri (2017) , who study the difference between Nasdaq and NYSE PDRs through time. They find that the PDR difference between the two exchanges shrinks as the ways that stocks trade between the two exchanges converge. In contrast, we focus on the level of Nasdaq PDRs. While the Nasdaq PDRs change with execution costs as one would expect, the level of Nasdaq PDRs is still too low today to be explained by traditional ex-day theories. That is, our results suggest that the traditional rational explanations are not enough to explain the ex-day behavior and that behavioral biases such as the "free dividend fallacy" are likely to play an important role.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature and develop the hypotheses. We describe the data in Section 3 and examine the tax hypothesis in Section 4. We examine the short-term trading hypothesis in Section 5 and consider market microstructure explanations in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
Literature review and hypotheses development
As the ex-day literature dates back over half a century, we only provide a brief description here and lay out our hypotheses. An excellent summary of the literature can be found in Kalay and Lemmon (2008) .
Tax hypotheses

PDRs and taxes
In their seminal paper, Elton and Gruber (1970) point out a dollar of capital gains is worth more than a dollar of dividends whenever capital gains are taxed more favorably than dividends. As investors care about after-tax returns, in equilibrium investors will be indifferent between selling on the cum-day or the ex-day if:
where Pcum and E(Pex) are cum-day and expected ex-day prices, Pcost is the price initially paid for the stock by an investor, D is the dividend amount and td and tg are the dividend and capital gain tax rates, respectively. The left-hand side of equation (1) represents the after-tax proceeds from selling the stock cum-dividend and the right-hand side represents the after-tax proceeds from selling the stock ex-dividend. Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
Equation (2) is also the equilibrium outcome if one repeats the analysis from the viewpoint of a prospective buyer (Elton and Gruber, 1970) . The left-hand side of equation (2) is the expected PDR. We follow Elton and Gruber (1970) and use the right-hand side of equation (2) to impute the dividend tax rate of the marginal investor. We also use the right-hand side of equation (2) to form the lowest theoretical bound for the PDR (which we denote as PDRT) assuming the marginal investor is taxed at the highest marginal tax rate prevailing at the time. If capital gains are taxed more favorably than dividends for the marginal investor (i.e., if td>tg, as has historically been the case for retail investors) then the PDR will be less than one. If the marginal investor is indifferent between dividends and capital gains (i.e., if td=tg, as is the case for short-term traders, pension funds, etc.) then the PDR will equal one. 9 If the marginal investor has a tax preference for dividends over capital gains (i.e., if td<tg, as is the case for corporations), then the PDR will be greater than one.
Using NYSE data for from 1966 and 1967 , Elton and Gruber (1970 find that the PDR is, on average, around 80%. Moreover, they find the imputed tax rates are consistent with the top marginal rates observed during the period. Many others have since found support for the Elton and Gruber (1970) tax hypothesis (for example, Barclay, 1987; Graham, Michaely and Roberts, 2003; Graham and Kumar, 2006; Whitworth and Rao, 2010) . However, using the same sample period 9 We note, as does the ex-day literature, that although the nominal tax rates may be equal, the tax rate on dividends is effectively greater than that on capital gains because of the deferral and tax timing options associated with capital gains. Chay, Choi and Pontiff (2006) estimate a dollar of realized capital gains is equivalent to $0.93 of unrealized capital gains. Kalay (1982) finds that the average NYSE PDR is not significantly different from one after making adjustments to the ex-day close prices in Elton and Gruber (1970) . He interprets this evidence as consistent with the marginal investor around ex-dates being tax-neutral short-term traders. To the extent that Nasdaq firms are held more by retail investors, the Elton and Gruber (1970) tax hypothesis is more applicable in the Nasdaq setting. We thus expect:
HTax Hypothesis: The PDR for Nasdaq-listed firms is
Tax clienteles
If taxes are an important consideration for investors, those facing relatively low marginal tax rates may favor high dividend-yielding stocks and those facing relatively high marginal tax rates may favor low dividend-yielding stocks. That is, tax clienteles may form. If tax clienteles exist then the PDR will increase in dividend yield. Elton and Gruber (1970) find that the implied marginal tax rates from the PDR are higher for low dividend yield stocks. Barclay (1987) and Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003) , amongst others, find evidence consistent with a tax clienteles explanation.
Moreover, studies such as Brav and Heaton (1997) , Dhaliwal, Erickson and Trezevant (1999) and Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find institutional investors prefer dividend-paying firms, again consistent with a tax-induced preference. We use Nasdaq firms to test the tax clientele hypothesis:
HTax Clienteles: The PDR for Nasdaq-listed firms is increasing in dividend yield.
Non-taxable distributions
If taxes are the driving force behind ex-day returns, then for non-taxable distributions we will not observe similar ex-day price behavior. Using NYSE firms, Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) find that the ex-day price drop behavior for non-taxable distributions (i.e. stock dividends and stock splits)
is even more pronounced than that for taxable distributions. 10 This is at odds with the Elton and Gruber (1970) tax hypothesis. However, Conrad and Conroy (1994) analyze the order flow biases in the measurement of ex-day returns for splitting stocks and find that the post-split order flow has an increased tendency for the stock's closing price to occur at the ask price. They estimate 80% of the ex-day return for NYSE firms (48% for Nasdaq firms) can be accounted for by such order imbalances, thus significantly diminishing the effect Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) document. If the Nasdaq ex-day price behavior is driven by taxes, non-taxable distributions will not result in significant ex-day abnormal returns. That is:
HNon-Taxable: Nasdaq excess ex-day returns are positive for taxable distributions and zero for nontaxable distributions.
Short-term trading hypothesis
Not all investors have a tax preference for dividends over capital gains. Thus, in the absence of transaction costs an expected PDR of less than one presents profit opportunities to some market participants. Consequently, another strand of the literature argues that one cannot infer the marginal tax rate of retail investors from the PDR as the PDR reflects the transaction costs faced by tax-neutral or tax-advantaged entities (see, for example, Kalay, 1982; Walkling, 1988, 1990; Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994; Koski, 1996; Michaely and Villa, 1996) . This view is termed the "short-term trading hypothesis". Kalay (1982) develops a model in which tax-neutral arbitrageurs are also risk neutral and dominate the market around ex-days to exploit any difference between the ex-day price and the dividend. He finds the observed ex-day price declines can be of the same order of magnitude as transaction costs. Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) develop a more general model that incorporates trading among individual investors, tax-neutral arbitrageurs and tax-advantaged corporate traders in the presence of both transaction costs and risk. They show that equilibrium trading among the three types of traders gives rise to a non-linear relation between the ex-day price drop and dividend yield. Empirically they test the theory by regressing the ex-day percentage price drop on dividend yield. When individual investors are the marginal traders, their model predicts the slope coefficient is less than one (but not less than PDRT). If short-term arbitrageurs are the marginal investors, the slope coefficient will be one. If corporate dividend capturers are the marginal investors then the slope coefficient will be greater than one. In regressions using NYSE-listed firms, Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) find a slope coefficient of one suggesting short-term traders are the marginal price-setters around ex-days, consistent with the short-term trading hypothesis.
We adopt the Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) (ii). a short-term arbitrageur then the slope coefficient will be one;
(iii). a corporation then the slope coefficient will be greater than one.
Tick-size hypothesis
Another strand of the literature focuses on market microstructure-based explanations. Frank and Jagannathan (1998) argue PDRs of less than one can be driven by bid-ask bounce if dividends are a "nuisance" to collect (and reinvest) for retail investors. They argue market makers have a competitive cost advantage in handling dividends so they purchase stocks cum-dividend and sell stocks ex-dividend. The resulting bid-ask bounce can lead to ex-day PDRs of less than one.
However, their study focused on Hong Kong during a period when settlement procedures required physical delivery of share certificates consequently making dividend capture strategies more costly. Once this procedure was automated (i.e. electronic settlement introduced), PDRs of less than one disappeared (Kadapakkam (2000) ). Thus, the "nuisance" argument is less plausible now and less plausible for Nasdaq (or NYSE) firms as electronic settlement is the norm during our sample period. Bali and Hite (1998) propose another market microstructure argument driven by price discreteness. They argue minimum tick-sizes can induce PDRs of less than one as the cumday to ex-day price change is rounded to a tick below the dividend (i.e., less than the dividend but within one tick of the dividend). However, Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003) find NYSE PDRs significantly decrease around minimum tick-size reductions, opposite the prediction from the price discreteness argument. We follow Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003) and investigate whether Nasdaq PDRs change in line with the Bali and Hite (1998) argument around mandated tick-size reductions. Specifically, we test the following hypothesis:
HTick-Size: The PDR for Nasdaq-listed firms increases as the minimum tick-size decreases.
Data description
We begin with domestic dividend-paying firms in CRSP (share codes 10 and 11) and focus on regular taxable cash dividends, i.e. distribution types 12N2 for N=1 to 9 (Michaely and Vila, 1996) .
In cases where a firm pays more than one taxable cash dividend on an ex-date, we follow Bali and Hite (1998) and combine the dividends into a single dividend. We ensure there is no change in the number of shares outstanding from the cum-day to the ex-day and that there are no other distributions within four days of the ex-date (Whitworth and Rao, 2010) . We also ensure there are no dividend announcements within four days of the ex-date (Eades, Hess and Kim, 1984) . If a firm has multiple distribution types on the same ex-date, we exclude that observation (Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994; Jakob and Ma, 2004) . We also exclude cases where the dividend yield is greater than 10% (Kadapakkam, 2000; Whitworth and Rao, 2010) . We eliminate observations when there are more than 365 days between ex-days or less than 4 days between ex-days (Eades, Hess and Kim, 1984; Whitworth and Rao, 2010) . We also eliminate observations when the cumprice is less than $5 (Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2005; Jakob and Ma, 2004) . As the PDR is impacted more by a given price fluctuation for smaller dividends, we eliminate cases where the dividend is less than $0.05 (Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2005; Whitworth and Rao, 2010) . We follow Whitworth and Rao (2010) in obtaining top marginal tax rates for dividends and capital gains. As is common in the literature (see, amongst others, Michaely and Vila, 1996; Whitworth and Rao, 2010) , we compute the expected-return-adjusted PDR as:
where E(Pex) is the actual ex-day price discounted one day using the single index market model estimated over the trading day interval [-50,-6 We use the CRSP value-weighted market index return on the stock's ex-day as the market return in the single index model. Using the CRSP equal-weighted market index return does not alter our inferences. 12 Imposing an additional sample filter that a trade must occur on both the cum-day and the ex-day does not materially affect the results we report or the inferences we make. Note that Nasdaq daily volume data are only available from 1983 onwards. The results from imposing this additional filter are available upon request.
In Table 1 we report summary statistics for the full sample and compare the Nasdaq results with the NYSE results. The average Nasdaq dividend yield is 0.93% for the 1973-2015 period (median is 0.79%), which is similar to the average NYSE dividend yield over the corresponding period. While the average Nasdaq dividend is $0.19, the average price drop is only $0.06 (the median dividend is $0.15 and the median price drop is $0.00). On average, 21 days elapse between the announcement day and the ex-day (the median is 14 days). It is striking that the average Nasdaq PDR for our sample is only 39% (median is 27%). This average PDR is far from one and substantially smaller than that of NYSE firms (mean is 86% and median is 93%).
<Table 1 here>
To highlight the difference between Nasdaq-versus NYSE-listed firms on the ex-days, we pool Nasdaq and corresponding NYSE data together and regress the PDRs on various explanatory variables identified in the ex-day literature. The results are reported in Table 2 . We start this analysis by including a Nasdaq dummy in the regression, and then add explanatory variables one at a time. The coefficient on the Nasdaq dummy exhibits a significant negative effect on the PDR across all model specifications. In Model (1) the Nasdaq coefficient is -0.67 and as we add explanatory variables to the regression, the Nasdaq coefficient remains fairly constant. That is, adding the explanatory variables does not help in reducing the Nasdaq coefficient. In short, the Nasdaq PDR is significantly below the NYSE PDR by about two-thirds. Consistent with Table 1, the Nasdaq PDR results are striking and puzzling. We explore the Nasdaq PDR and its relation to the various ex-day explanations further in the next section.
<Table 2 here>
Testing tax-based explanations
Tax hypothesis
13 When we restrict the sample to 2003-2015, a period where the dividend and capital gains tax rates are essentially equal, we find that the Nasdaq PDR has increased and is closer to the corresponding NYSE PDR for the same period, consistent with Mortal, Paudel and Silveri (2017) . However, the average Nasdaq PDR of 67% for this period is still well below one, both statistically and economically. Figure 1 plots the average PDR through time along with PDRT, the lower theoretical bound for the PDR from the tax hypothesis assuming that the marginal investor is a retail investor taxed at the highest marginal rate for the corresponding period. 14 It appears that the PDR fluctuates much more through time than PDRT and increases substantially around 2008. Inconsistent with the tax hypothesis, the PDR is almost always below the lowest theoretical bound (and as we will see shortly, significantly so).
<Figure 1 here> Table 3 reports additional summary statistics for the PDR. As reported in Table 1 , the average Nasdaq PDR is 39%. We find that the average Nasdaq PDR of 39% is significantly below the lower theoretical bound of 76%. The imputed tax rate of 71% for the sample period is more than one and half times the observed highest tax rate over the corresponding period. 15 To reduce the impact of small dividends, we restrict the sample to dividends greater than $0.125 (i.e., greater than a one-eighth tick size). We find that the average Nasdaq PDR remains around 39% and is again significantly below the lower theoretical bound. This PDR translates to an imputed tax rate that is more than one and half times the observed highest tax rate. Next, as many firms may pay a dividend on the same date (which raises the possibility of returns on the same date being correlated.), we average the PDRs for a given date and then average across ex-days. Once again, the results from doing so are largely unaffected. Overall, the evidence in Table 3 is not consistent with the tax hypothesis.
<Table 3 here> Over our sample period, both the top marginal tax rate (td) and the capital gains tax rate (tg) change. Accordingly, in Table 4 we partition our sample into four distinct tax regimes. The first regime corresponds to cases when the two rates are equal. The second reflects cases when td is between 1 and 1.5 times tg. The third corresponds to cases when td is between 1.5 and 2 times tg, while the final regime corresponds to cases when the top marginal tax rate is more than 2 times the capital gains tax rate. As is evident from Table 4 , regardless of the tax regime the PDR is significantly below PDRT, the lower theoretical bound implied by the tax hypothesis. Moreover, the imputed tax rates range from 1.3 to 2.7 times the observed tax rates over the corresponding periods. For example, in the second regime when td is between 1.0 and 1.5 times tg, the average PDR is 31%, significantly below the lower theoretical bound (PDRT) of 87%. This PDR translates to an imputed dividend tax rate of 77%, more than double the actual rate for the corresponding period. Once again, the Nasdaq evidence is inconsistent with the tax hypothesis.
<Table 4 here>
We next turn to transaction costs as a potential explanation for our results. We note,
however, that in the presence of significant transaction costs PDRs are more likely to reflect the marginal tax rate of retail investors as arbitrage by tax neutral or tax-advantaged investors becomes difficult (Elton, Gruber and Rentzler, 1984; Karpoff and Walkling, 1990; Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994) . Nonetheless, in Table 5 we partition the sample into quartiles formed quarterly based on various proxies for transaction costs. Panel A of Table 5 presents the results using Amihud's (2002) stock illiquidity measure as a proxy for transaction costs. 16 This measure is computed as the absolute value of the daily return divided by the daily dollar trading volume (in millions), averaged over the event window [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-dividend day. In each illiquidity quartile, the average Nasdaq PDR is significantly below PDRT and translates to an imputed marginal rate well in excess of the actual rate. For example, the average PDR in quartile one (least illiquid, i.e., most liquid firms) is 56% and translates to an imputed marginal rate of 56%, almost double the average actual top marginal rate for the corresponding period.
We observe a similar pattern to Panel A in the remainder of Table 5 . Panel B uses the bidask spread as a proxy for transaction costs, Panel C uses the inverse of stock price, Panel D uses relative firm risk as measured by the ratio of the standard deviation of stock returns to the standard deviation of the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio and Panel E uses market capitalization.
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16 When using the illiquidity measure and later, the bid-ask spread measure, the number of observations decreases as trading volume and bid-ask data are only available from 1983 onwards. 17 In untabulated results we also use the total dividend amount paid out by the firm and find similar results.
For each transaction cost proxy and for each quartile, the average Nasdaq PDR remains significantly below the lower theoretical bound PDRT. The PDRs translate to imputed rates well in excess of the average observed top marginal rates. Overall, the Nasdaq evidence is inconsistent with the tax hypothesis even for firms with relatively small transaction costs.
<Table 5 here>
Tax clienteles hypothesis
If tax clienteles exist then PDRs will increase with dividend yield. To test this hypothesis, in Table   6 we partition the sample into dividend yield quartiles. We find that the average PDR is significantly decreasing in dividend yield. In particular, the average PDR decreases from 62.3%
in the smallest dividend yield quartile to 34.6% in the largest dividend yield quartile. This decrease of 27.7% in absolute terms is statistically significant and opposite the tax clientele hypothesis.
Thus, we again find evidence inconsistent with a tax-based explanation.
<Table 6 here>
Non-taxable distributions
If taxes are the driving force behind the ex-day results then we will not observe similar ex-day price behavior for non-taxable distributions. We follow the methodology in Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and measure average ex-day excess returns for both taxable and non-taxable distributions.
On each ex-day we form equally weighted portfolios using all firms going ex-dividend. We compute the average ex-day excess return by subtracting from the ex-day portfolio return the mean portfolio return over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day. We do this for each ex-day during our sample period. As the composition of the ex-day portfolio changes over time, we also compute the average standardized ex-day excess return for each ex-day (see Eades, Hess and Kim, 1984, for further details). Table 7 presents the results. The average ex-day excess return is 0.57% for taxable distributions and 1.34% for non-taxable distributions. Moreover, both excess returns are statistically significant at the 1% level. Conrad and Conroy (1994) document that up to 80% of the excess returns for non-taxable dividends in Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) are attributable to order imbalances driven by a tendency for transactions to occur at the ask price after the distribution.
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They note, however, this tendency is significantly less severe for Nasdaq firms as at most 48% is attributable to such order imbalances after non-taxable distributions. Thus, even if order imbalances explain half the excess returns we document for non-taxable distributions, the size of the Nasdaq excess returns are still substantial. Moreover, as these are non-taxable distributions, taxes cannot drive these results. The Nasdaq non-taxable distribution results provide further evidence against the tax hypothesis.
<Table 7 here>
Testing the short-term trading hypothesis
To determine whether the Nasdaq evidence is consistent with the short-term trading hypothesis, we follow the methodology in Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) and run regressions of the ex-day percentage price drop on dividend yield. Table 8 presents the results. In the first regression of Panel A, the slope coefficient of 0.47 is significantly less than one. This suggests the marginal investor is not a tax-neutral or tax-advantaged investor. Thus, the evidence is inconsistent with the short-term trading hypothesis. Moreover, the slope coefficient is significantly less than the lower theoretical bound (PDRT) implied by the tax hypothesis. Next, we restrict the sample to cases where the dividend is at least $0.125, i.e., cases in which dividend capture is more likely. Once again, the slope coefficient of 0.54 is significantly less than one and significantly below PDRT.
Thus, even for firms where dividend capture is more likely, the evidence is inconsistent with the short-term trading hypothesis (and inconsistent with the tax hypothesis).
As many firms may go ex-dividend on the same date, this raises the possibility of returns on the same date being correlated. To address this issue, we average the ex-day returns and dividend yields across ex-dates and re-run the regressions. We find that the slope coefficient decreases to 0.35 and remains significantly less than one and significantly below PDRT. Again, the evidence is inconsistent with the short-term trading hypothesis (and the tax hypothesis).
Finally, in order to further reduce the sensitivity of our estimates to outliers, we divide the sample into dividend yield vigintiles and re-run the regressions using the average of each vigintile (Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994) . The resulting slope coefficient of 0.42 is again significantly less than one and significantly less than PDRT.
In Panel B of Table 8 we partition the sample into four distinct tax regimes as in Table 4 .
In each of the tax regimes we investigate, the dividend yield slope coefficient is significantly less than one, thus inconsistent with the short-term trading hypothesis. Moreover, the slope coefficient is also significantly less than PDRT, the lower bound implied by the tax hypothesis. Overall, the evidence from Table 8 does not accord with the short-term trading hypothesis.
<Table 8 here> As significant transaction costs can limit the ability of short-term traders to arbitrage expected PDRs of less than one, we partition the sample by various transaction cost proxies in Table 9 . As with Table 5 , we form the quartile partitions every quarter. Panel A of Table 9 presents the results using Amihud's (2002) stock illiquidity measure as a transaction cost proxy. In each quartile the slope coefficient is significantly less than one. For example, the slope coefficient of 0.47 in the first quartile (i.e. most liquid firms) is significantly less than one. This is also true for the slope coefficient of 0.42 in the last quartile (i.e. least liquid firms). This evidence is inconsistent with the short-term trading hypothesis. In the remainder of Table 9 we observe a similar pattern to For each transaction cost proxy and for each quartile, the slope coefficients are significantly below one. Even for firms with relatively small transaction costs, the evidence is inconsistent with short-term traders being the marginal price-setters. As a result, transaction costs do not appear to be driving our results. Moreover, the slope coefficients are less than the lower bound implied by the tax hypothesis. Overall, the evidence from Table 9 is generally inconsistent with the short-term trading hypothesis. <Table 9 here>
Testing other explanations
In Table 10 we test the Bali and Hite (1998) tick-size explanation by following the methodology in Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003) . In particular, we investigate whether PDRs significantly increase around mandated tick-size reductions for Nasdaq firms. We find that neither the median nor the mean increases significantly when the tick-size is reduced. That is, reducing the tick-size from 1/8 th to 1/16 th and then to decimalization does not significantly increase the PDR, inconsistent with the tick-size explanation.
We also investigate additional microstructure arguments. Other exchanges with particularly small average PDRs include those in Japan and Canada. Kato and Loewenstein (1995) find that the average PDR in Japan is negative (i.e., prices rise on the ex-date). They attribute this to inter-corporate trading activities aimed at manipulating prices in order to obtain tax or other benefits. This is unlikely an explanation for Nasdaq firms where inter-corporate trading is far less common. 20 Vermaelen (1983, 1992) find that the average PDR for the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) is too small to be explained by taxes or transaction costs. Jakob and Ma (2005) attribute the TSX evidence to the TSX not adjusting prices in the outstanding limit orders on ex-dividend days. However, since 1993 Nasdaq has used an automated limit order adjustment mechanism on the ex-dividend day. When we exclude the period prior to 1993, our results are unaffected. Thus, this argument does not explain our results. Another microstructure argument deals with dealer quotes. Prior to the mid-1990s, Nasdaq dealers avoided odd-eighths price quotes (Christie and Schultz, 1994) . When we restrict the sample to the period after 1997, our results are again unaffected. Thus, overall, these market microstructure arguments do not explain our results.
21 <Table 10 here> 20 In Japan, most firms are affiliated with business groups and engage in inter-corporate trading and reciprocal shareholding (Kato and Loewenstein, 1995) . 21 In further tests, we allow for the possibility that Nasdaq prices may reflect information relatively slowly by computing the PDR using the price from the day after the ex-date and find similar results. Also using the price two days and three days after the ex-date yields similar results.
Conclusion
We provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the Nasdaq ex-day price behavior. The stylized fact that prices drop by less than the dividend amount on the ex-day has been noted for over half a century. Whilst the literature almost exclusively focuses on NYSE-listed firms, we use Nasdaqlisted firms as an "out of sample" test of the various explanations. The Nasdaq sample is nontrivial as more than a third of all U.S. dividend payers reside on the Nasdaq.
Similar to NYSE firms, prices fall by less than the dividend amount for Nasdaq firms.
However, the average Nasdaq PDR is substantially smaller than that observed for NYSE firms and translates to an imputed dividend tax rate that is about double the average maximum tax rate over the sample period. We test the tax explanation along many dimensions and find little support.
Overall, our results suggest that taxes are not the driving force behind the ex-day price behavior for Nasdaq firms. In addition, we do not find support for the short-term trading hypothesis or various other rational explanations. Any explanation of the ex-day price anomaly also needs to account for the Nasdaq evidence, a non-trivial portion of the dividend-paying population. Our results also shed some light on a new hypothesis proposed by Hartzmark and Solomon (2018) -the free dividends fallacy, i.e., investors' mental accounts simply do not combine dividends and price changes into total returns. To the extent that Nasdaq firms are more prone to price changes and have a greater ownership concentration of retail investors relative to NYSE firms, one would expect the disconnect between dividends and ex-day price drops to be more evident in the Nasdaq setting. That is, our results suggest that behavioral biases such as the "free dividend fallacy" potentially play an important role on the ex-day. The sample comprises domestic dividend-paying Nasdaq-and NYSE-listed firms in CRSP paying regular taxable cash dividends, i.e., distribution types 12N2 (N=1 to 9). The sample period spans 1973-2015. Dividend is the per share dividend amount. Stock Price is the cum-day closing stock price. Dividend Yield is the ratio of the Dividend to the Stock Price. Price-Drop is the change in the closing stock price from the cum-day to the ex-day. Price-Drop Ratio (PDR) is the price change from the cum-day to the ex-day expressed as a percentage of the Dividend. In computing the PDR, we adjust the ex-day price by discounting it one day using the single index market model estimated over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day. Market Cap is the firm's market capitalization on the cum-day, i.e., the product of the Stock Price with the number of cum-day shares outstanding. Days Since Announcement is the number of days between the announcement date and the ex-dividend date. The sample comprises domestic dividend-paying Nasdaq-and NYSE-listed firms in CRSP (share codes 10 and 11) paying regular taxable cash dividends, i.e. distribution types 12N2 (N=1 to 9), over the 1973-2015 period. The dependent variable is the price-drop ratio (PDR), which is computed as the price change from the cum-day to the ex-day expressed as a percentage of the dividend amount. In computing the PDR, we adjust the ex-day price by discounting it one day using the single index market model estimated over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] trading days relative to the ex-day. The regressions are weighted by (Dividend Yield 2 / VAR), where VAR is the variance of stock returns over the [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] trading day window relative to the ex-day. Nasdaq (0/1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the dividend is from a Nasdaq-listed firm and zero for a NYSE-listed firm. Dividend Yield is the ratio of the dividend to the cum-day closing stock price. Firm Size is the ratio of the market value of the stock on cum-day to the market value of all stocks in CRSP universe on the cum-day. Price Reciprocal (1/P) is measured on the cum-day. Tax Differential is the ratio of (1-td) to (1-tg), where td and tg denote the tax rates on dividend income and capital gains, respectively. We report t-stats, in parentheses, below the corresponding coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample comprises domestic dividend-paying Nasdaq-listed firms in CRSP (share codes 10 and 11) paying regular taxable cash dividends, i.e. distribution types 12N2 (N=1 to 9), over the 1973-2015 period. PDR is the price-drop ratio computed as the price change from the cum-day to the ex-day expressed as a percentage of the dividend amount. In computing the PDR, we adjust the ex-day price by discounting it one day using the single index market model estimated over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day. PDRT is the theoretical lower bound for the PDR and is computed as the ratio of (1-td) to (1-tg) where td is the highest personal tax rate on dividend income and tg is the highest personal tax rate on long-term capital gains prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. Difference is the difference between PDR and PDRT. Imputed td is the imputed tax rate backed out from the theoretical PDR using the actual average highest capital gain tax rate, tg, prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. Actual td is the actual average highest dividend tax rate prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The sample comprises domestic dividend-paying Nasdaq-listed firms in CRSP (share codes 10 and 11) paying regular taxable cash dividends, i.e. distribution types 12N2 (N=1 to 9), over the 1973-2015 period. PDR is the price-drop ratio computed as the price change from the cum-day to the ex-day expressed as a percentage of the dividend amount. In computing the PDR, we adjust the ex-day price by discounting it one day using the single index market model estimated over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day. PDRT is the theoretical lower bound for the PDR and is computed as the ratio of (1-td) to (1-tg) where td is the highest personal tax rate on dividend income and tg is the highest personal tax rate on long-term capital gains prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. Difference is the difference between PDR and PDRT. Imputed td is the imputed tax rate backed out from the theoretical PDR using the actual average highest capital gain tax rate, tg, prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. Actual td is the actual average highest dividend tax rate prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. Tax regimes are based upon the ratio of the prevailing td to tg at the time of the dividend payment. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The sample comprises domestic dividend-paying Nasdaq-listed firms in CRSP (share codes 10 and 11) paying regular taxable cash dividends, i.e. distribution types 12N2 (N=1 to 9), over the 1973-2015 period. PDR is the price-drop ratio computed as the price change from the cum-day to the ex-day expressed as a percentage of the dividend amount. In computing the PDR, we adjust the ex-day price by discounting it one day using the single index market model estimated over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day. PDRT is the theoretical lower bound for the PDR and is computed as the ratio of (1-td) to (1-tg) where td is the highest personal tax rate on dividend income and tg is the highest personal tax rate on long-term capital gains prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. Difference is the difference between PDR and PDRT. Imputed td is the imputed tax rate backed out from the theoretical PDR using the actual average highest capital gain tax rate, tg, prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. Actual td is the actual average highest dividend tax rate prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. Panel A reports results using Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure as a transaction cost proxy. Illiquidity is computed as the absolute value of the daily return divided by daily dollar trading volume (in millions), averaged over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day. Panel B reports results using the bid-ask spread, computed as the difference between the ask price and the bid price divided by the average of the ask price and the bid price over the 11 day interval centered on the ex-day. Panel C reports results using the price reciprocal measured on the cum-day. Panel D reports results using relative risk, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of security returns over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day, to the standard deviation of the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio over the same period. Panel E reports results using market capitalization defined as the stock price multiplied by the shares outstanding, both measured on the cum-day. We define the quartile (Q) breakpoints every quarter. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The sample comprises domestic dividend-paying Nasdaq-listed firms in CRSP (share codes 10 and 11) paying regular taxable cash dividends, i.e. distribution types 12N2 (N=1 to 9), over the 1973-2015 period. PDR is the price-drop ratio computed as the price change from the cum-day to the ex-day expressed as a percentage of the dividend amount. In computing the PDR, we adjust the ex-day price by discounting it one day using the single index market model estimated over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day. We use the Dividend Yield, computed as the ratio of the per share dividend amount to the cum-day stock price, to form dividend yield quartiles every quarter. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The sample comprises domestic dividend-paying Nasdaq-listed firms in CRSP (share codes 10 and 11) paying regular taxable cash dividends, i.e. distribution types 12N2 (N=1 to 9), over the 1973-2015 period. We use CRSP distribution codes 5523, 5533 and 5543 to identify non-taxable distributions (stock dividends and stock splits). On each ex-day we form equally weighted portfolios using all firms going ex-dividend. We then compute the average ex-day excess return by subtracting from the ex-day portfolio return the mean portfolio return over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day. We do this for each ex-day during our sample period. As the composition of the ex-day portfolios changes over time, we also compute the average standardized ex-day excess return for each ex-day (see Eades, Hess and Kim, 1984 , for further details). *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The sample comprises domestic dividend-paying Nasdaq-listed firms in CRSP (share codes 10 and 11) paying regular taxable cash dividends, i.e. distribution types 12N2 (N=1 to 9), over the 1973-2015 period. The dependent variable in the regressions is percentage price drop (i.e. the price change from the cum-day to the ex-day expressed as a percentage of the cum-day price). The independent variable in the regressions is Dividend Yield, defined as the ratio of the dividend amount to the cum-price. PDRT is the theoretical lower bound for the price-drop ratio and is computed as the ratio of (1-td) to (1-tg) where td is the highest personal tax rate on dividend income and tg is the highest personal tax rate on long-term capital gains prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. Panel A reports regression results using Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure as a transaction cost proxy. Illiquidity is computed as the absolute value of the daily return divided by daily dollar trading volume (in millions), averaged over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day. Panel B reports regression results using the bid-ask spread, computed as the difference between the ask price and the bid price divided by the average of the ask price and the bid price over the 11 day interval centered on the ex-day. Panel C reports regression results using the price reciprocal measured on the cum-day. Panel D reports regression results using relative risk, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of security returns over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day (day 0), to the standard deviation of the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio. Panel E reports regression results using market capitalization defined as the stock price multiplied by the shares outstanding, both measured on the cum-day as the proxy for transaction costs. Quartile (Q) breakpoints are computed each quarter. t-stats are in parentheses. t-stats immediately below the coefficients test against the null that the coefficient is zero. The sample comprises domestic dividend-paying Nasdaq-listed firms in CRSP (share codes 10 and 11) paying regular taxable cash dividends, i.e. distribution types 12N2 (N=1 to 9), over the 1996-2002 period. The PDR is the price-drop ratio computed as the price change from the cum-day to the ex-day expressed as a percentage of the dividend amount. 
Figure 1. Actual versus Theoretical PDRs through Time
This figure plots the average PDR through time along with PDRT, the lowest theoretical bound under the tax hypothesis. The sample comprises domestic dividend-paying Nasdaq-listed firms in CRSP (share codes 10 and 11) paying regular taxable cash dividends, i.e. distribution types 12N2 (N=1 to 9), over the period . PDR is the price-drop ratio computed as the price change from the cum-day to the ex-day expressed as a percentage of the dividend amount. In computing the PDR, we adjust the ex-day price by discounting it one day using the single index market model estimated over [-50, -6 ] U [+6, +20] relative to the ex-day. PDRT is the theoretical lower bound for the PDR under the tax hypothesis, and is computed as the ratio of (1-td) to (1-tg), where td is the highest marginal tax rate on dividend income for a retail investor prevailing at the time of the dividend payment and tg is the highest tax rate on long-term capital gains prevailing at the time of the dividend payment. 
